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CAN PRESIDENT TRUMP BE IMPEACHED AS MR. TRUMP? 




President Trump is only the fourth executive branch officer in the na-
tion’s history to be impeached by the House of Representatives, not one of 
whom has been removed by the Senate. Not surprisingly, many constitu-
tional questions about the House and Senate’s roles in the impeachment pro-
cess remain unanswered: for what conduct can an officer be impeached; must 
the impeachable conduct be undertaken while serving as an officer; does an 
impeached officer have the right to introduce witnesses of his or her choice, 
and so on. 
Temporal aspects of impeachment have never been resolved as well. 
Consider whether a Democratic Congress down the road can impeach and 
convict President Trump after he leaves office. The House, of course, did not 
take a vote after President Nixon’s resignation, but that omission may have 
been out of political prudence as opposed to want of constitutional power. 
Most academics considering the issue have concluded that the removal of an 
executive branch officer or judge from office does not defeat Congress’s ju-
risdiction to impeach and try the officer.1 They reason that, even when an 
* Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law. I thank Brian Kalt and Mark Rosen for comments on earlier 
drafts. 
 1.  For a representative sampling, see MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT 
PROCESS 81–83 (3d ed. 2019); Brian C. Kalt, The Constitutional Case for the Impeachability of Former 
Federal Officials: An Analysis of the Law, History, and Practice of Late Impeachment, 6 TEX. REV. L. &
POL. 13, 18 (2001-2002); Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
1083, 1152 (2009); Edwin Brown Firmage & R. Collin Mangrum, Removal of the President: Resignation 
and the Procedural Law of Impeachment, 1974 Duke L. J. 1023, 1101 (1975); Arthur Bestor, Impeach-
ment, 49 WASH. L. REV. 255, 277–78 (1973) (book review); see also Salvador Rizzo, Can Former Pres-
idents be Impeached?, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2019, 2:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/12/06/can-former-presidents-be-impeached/ 
[https://perma.cc/BSY4-VYAR] (reporting that Professors Akhil Amar and Keith Whittington support a 
continuous power of impeachment). The leading commentary against a continuous power was articulated 
by Justice Story in JUSTICE STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 405 
(vol. 3 1833) (“If, then, there must be a judgment of removal from office, it would seem to follow, that 
the constitution contemplated, that the party was still in office at the time of impeachment.”), but few 
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officer is no longer in “office,” the House may still impeach and the Senate 
convict in order to disqualify the individual from serving in office in the fu-
ture. Indeed, members of Congress tried to galvanize support to impeach 
President Clinton after he left office.2
Although neither the constitutional language nor sparse history is clear, 
I argue below, based on a structural understanding of our system of separated 
powers, that Congress can only initiate impeachment when an officer is in 
office. Impeachment is about preserving the system of checks and balances 
at a given time, not punishing the individual. 
In Part I, I briefly summarize the scant history of impeachment of ex-
ecutive branch officials that led up to ratification of our Constitution. In Part 
II, I focus on the impeachment clauses in Article I and II of the Constitution, 
which support, to a limited extent, a reading that the House can only trigger 
impeachment for individuals currently in office. In Part III, I examine the 
few precedents that have arisen after ratification of the Constitution in which 
Congress has considered whether to impeach an officer who does not at that 
time occupy the office. Finally, in Part IV, I argue that Congress’s impeach-
ment authority is best understood as a weapon to remove officers from posi-
tions of public power, and that the concomitant power to disqualify an officer 
from future offices of public trust does not transform the impeachment rem-
edy into a potential Sword of Damocles hanging over the heads of officers 
for the rest of their lives. Otherwise, the impeachment power would resemble 
a Bill of Attainder and could be used as a tool to punish opponents of a sitting 
Congress as well as disqualify leading opposition party candidates who pre-
viously had served in offices of public trust from participating in federal pol-
itics in the future.3
PART I
As a matter of history, there is considerable support for a continuing 
power of impeachment even after the officer has left office. The British par-
liament exercised such power, a number of the state legislatures after 1776 
did as well, and the Framers in enacting the impeachment clauses did not 
directly reject that tradition. 
 2.  See, e.g., Kalt, supra note 1, at 125. 
 3.  For an informative summary of the arguments pro and con, see also BRIAN C. KALT,
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Parliament’s impeachment authority included the power to impeach 
former officers, and indeed, private parties.4 For instance, the House of Com-
mons impeached and the House of Lords convicted Lord Chancellor Mac-
clesfield in 1725 after he left office.5 The House of Commons also 
impeached the first Governor-General of India, Warren Hastings, after he 
left office in 1786, although the House of Lords ultimately acquitted him.6
On the other hand, given that Parliament enjoyed the power to impeach pri-
vate citizens as well as officers, the fact that it could impeach and convict 
former officers is not that surprising. 
In the newly independent states, legislatures also impeached state offi-
cials after they were no longer in office. Although not widely remembered, 
the Virginia legislature briefly considered impeaching Thomas Jefferson af-
ter he left the governorship for abandoning his duties as governor during the 
War for Independence.7 Virginia’s Constitution explicitly addressed the tim-
ing issue, providing that impeachment could only proceed against “[t]he 
Governor, when he is out of office.”8 The Vermont Constitution also covered 
the timing question, providing that “Every officer of State, whether judicial 
or executive, shall be liable to be impeached by the General Assembly, either 
when in office, or after his resignation, or removal for maladministration.”9
The Vermont legislature impeached former assemblyman Jonathan Fassett 
for leading rioters bent on closing down county courts to frustrate debt col-
lection.10 Some of the other state constitutions as well explicitly or implicitly 
sanctioned impeachment after the officeholder left office, while others did 
not specify.11
Nor did the question of the timing of impeachments loom large at the 
Constitutional Convention. Several members cited the ongoing impeach-
ment of Governor Hastings in the House of Lords, but they did not specifi-
cally debate the question whether the impeachment power continued after an 
individual left office.12
 4.  The following is condensed from exposition in Kalt, supra note 1, at 22-28, and GERHARDT,
supra note 1, at 49–54. 
 5.  See sources cited supra note 4. 
 6.  Id.
 7.  Michael McDonnell, Thomas Jefferson as Governor of Virginia, ENCYCLOPEDIA VA. HUMAN.
(Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/Jefferson_Thomas_as_Governor_of_Vir-
ginia#start_entry [https://perma.cc/FZR3-LMUV]. 
 8.  VA. CONST. of 1776, art. XVI. 
 9.  VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II, § XX. 
 10.  See Background and History of Impeachment: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. On the 
Constitution of the Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. 226 (1998). 
 11.  See generally Kalt, supra note 1, at 29–33. 
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The Framers narrowed Parliament’s impeachment power in several crit-
ical ways. The remedy was confined to removal from office or disqualifica-
tion from future office (as opposed to the full range of criminal penalties); 
only “officers” as opposed to private parties could be impeached; and con-
viction was only possible based on a two-thirds vote.13 But, the history of the 
impeachment clauses does not shed much light on the timing of impeach-
ments one way or the other. The Framers were aware that, in England and in 
some states, the legislature enjoyed a continuous power to impeach officers, 
and yet failed to address the issue in the Constitution explicitly, even when 
removing the legislature’s power to impeach private citizens.14
PART II 
Squaring a continuous power of impeachment with the constitutional 
language, however, is far from simple. Article II provides that all officers 
impeached “shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Convic-
tion of, Treason, Bribery, or other high crimes and Misdemeanors.”15 The 
Clause in Article II does not address the timing issue explicitly, yet appears 
to limit impeachment of “officers” only when “removal” is possible, i.e., 
when the officer is still serving. 
Supporters of the continuous impeachment thesis principally rely on the 
impeachment clause in Article I, which admittedly leaves more wiggle room 
on the timing issue.16 That Clause provides that judgment in impeachment 
cases “shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualifi-
cation to hold and enjoy any [federal] Office.”17 Those supporting a contin-
uous power therefore read the Article I provision as implicitly conferring on 
Congress the choice of whether to pursue disqualification from office as the 
remedy even when removal is no longer relevant. They harmonize the two 
impeachment provisions by concluding that removal from office is required 
when an officer is still sitting, but disqualification is possible irrespective of 
whether an officer still serves.18
 13.  See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, IMPEACHMENT: A CITIZENS GUIDE 34–53 (2017). 
 14.  See GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 82. 
 15.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 16.  Some have construed the constitutional language instead to identify not whom can be im-
peached but for what conduct. They link the “officer” language to the “high crimes and Misdemeanors” 
phrase to conclude that only misconduct committed while in Office is subject to impeachment, and that 
the Constitution left the question of timing of impeachment in Congress’s hands. Kalt, supra note 1, at 
64. That reading, however, suffers from the same difficulties addressed, infra. Moreover, the President 
then could not be impeached for fraud during an election, and other officers as well would be immune for 
misconduct before assuming office. 
 17.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
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The above reading of the Constitution strikes me as strained for three 
reasons. First, the Framers provided that all “officers” “shall be removed 
from office on Impeachment.”19 The more likely reading of that provision is 
that “officers” describe those who have an “office,” as opposed to those who 
had an office previously. As a matter of grammar, the Clause seemingly ap-
plies to current officeholders, as opposed to those who may have served dur-
ing the prior month or even years previously. 
Indeed, the term “Officer” used elsewhere in Article II lends support to 
the argument that impeachment can only proceed against sitting office hold-
ers. The Succession Clause, also in Article II, provides that: 
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, . . . the Powers and 
Duties of the said Office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President, 
and [if the Vice President is incapacitated] Congress may by Law . . . 
declar[e] what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall 
act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be 
elected.20
Given the context, it makes little sense to construe “officer” to include 
former officeholders.21 The Framers presumably used “officers” in the same 
sense in companion clauses in Article II.22 And, given that the Framers were 
aware that some states had championed a continuous power of impeachment 
explicitly, their decision to specify that impeachments take place when indi-
viduals could “be removed from office” seems telling. 
Second, a continuous power of impeachment generates a series of 
thorny problems. For example, can a House impeach a former officer even 
if the House debated the issue while the officer was in office and at that time 
declined to impeach? Or, can a Senate convict a former officer after a prior 
Senate has acquitted? Moreover, we know that the Senate must muster a two-
thirds vote to convict a sitting officer, but does that safeguard still exist when 
all that is at stake is disqualification? Probably, but for the last 100 years, the 
Senate has maintained that it can disqualify an impeached official from hold-
ing office based on a majority vote, and it has done so three times.23
 19.  U.S. Const. art II, § 4. 
 20.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 21.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6 also provides that no member of the House or Senate can simultaneously 
serve as a civil officer, which bolsters the understanding that the Framers deployed the term to refer to 
those holding office contemporaneously. 
 22.  See Seth Barrett Tillman, Interpreting Precise Constitutional Text: The Argument for a New 
Interpretation of the Incompatibility Clause, the Removal & Disqualification Clause, and the Religious 
Test Clause—A Response to Professor Josh Chafetz’s Impeachment & Assassination, 61 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 285, 290 (2013). 
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Third, although the Impeachment Clause in Article I states that the pen-
alty for impeachment shall not extend beyond removal and disqualification 
from office, that clause reads as a limit on what type of punishment can be 
meted rather than addressing “when.” The Framers presumably were signal-
ing the change from the British practice under which additional penalties 
were possible. There is no language in the Clauses suggesting that the im-
peachment authority is continuous. 
PART III 
To this point, I have relayed that legislatures enjoyed the power in Eng-
land and to a lesser extent in the newly independent states to impeach officers 
after they left office but that, for whatever reason, the Framers did not clarify 
that power in the Constitution. I then argued that the constitutional language 
itself militates somewhat against the prospect of impeaching an officer who 
is no longer in office. The post-enactment history, however, suggests that 
many still believed in a legislative power to impeach officers after they were 
no longer in office. For instance, decades after stepping down as President, 
John Quincy Adams declared as a member of the House: “I hold myself, so 
long as I have the breath of life in my body, amenable to impeachment by 
this House for everything I did during the time I held any public office.”24
On two occasions in our history, Congress considered impeaching 
and/or convicting officers who were no longer in office.25 The first federal 
impeachment case centered on Senator William Blount, who evidently lent 
his services to a treasonous plot to help Great Britain.26 The House im-
peached him on July 7, 1797, and the next day the Senate expelled him.27
After the expulsion the Senate convened a trial to determine whether to con-
vict him upon the House’s vote to impeach.28 Although Blount principally 
argued that he, as a Senator, did not fall within the impeachment clause’s 
category of “civil officer,” he also argued that he could not be removed from 
office because the Senate had already expelled him after the House impeach-
ment.29 The Senate voted not to reach the merits of the House’s impeachment 
 24.  CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 641 (1846). Adams spoke in support of the House’s power 
to impeach Daniel Webster for conduct he previously committed as Secretary of State. Kalt, supra note 
1, at 91. 
 25.  See Kalt, supra note 1, at 84-97. 
 26.  Id. at 86. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
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charges, but the reasons for the decision to drop the case were not spelled 
out.30
The impeachment of Secretary of War William Belknap in 1876 poses 
a more relevant precedent. The House investigated Belknap for financial 
fraud, and Belknap resigned prior to any resolution.31 The House decided 
that it could continue with the investigation and voted shortly thereafter to 
impeach Belknap.32 After much discussion, the Senate voted 37–29 that it 
maintained jurisdiction over Belknap, despite his resignation. Ultimately, the 
Senate acquitted Belknap,33 and this precedent, therefore, represents a lim-
ited factor weighing in favor of the House’s authority to remove an officer 
who has left office (and the Senate’s authority to disqualify that officer), 
even though impeachment proceedings in his case had started when he was 
in office.34
PART IV
Although the historical precedents cannot be overlooked, impeachment 
as understood within our framework of separated powers should reach only 
those still holding office. Within our system of checks and balances, im-
peachment provides Congress a means to counteract misconduct in the co-
ordinate branches. If a secretary of state or judge abuses constitutional 
authority, Congress can ensure his or her ouster and thereby protect the pub-
lic.35 Congress cannot directly participate in law execution or judicial deci-
sion-making, but it can ensure that those who exercise law execution 
functions and judging have not committed high crimes or misdemeanors. 
I argue, first, that the power to impeach a former officeholder is not 
critical as a deterrence measure; second, that based upon surrounding provi-
sions limiting congressional authority to punish offenders, impeachment 
should be used to address contemporaneous misconduct, not that in the past; 
and, finally, that use of an impeachment tool twenty years after the fact 
would not only raise questions of intergenerational power, it would be vin-
dictive, in tension with the Bills of Attainder so roundly feared by the Fram-
ers. 
 30.  Id. at 126–27. 
 31.  Id. at 94. 
 32.  Id. at 94–96. 
 33.  Id. at 127–29. 
 34.  Precedents from state impeachment proceedings are mixed. See id. at 108–21. 
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A. Deterrence 
Supporters of a continuing power of impeachment have argued that, if 
impeachment is tied to holding office, there would be little to deter a Presi-
dent or other officeholder from misconduct in the final days in office.36  Im-
peachment, in part, serves to ensure that officers conduct their duties 
conscientiously. Some members of Congress advocated for impeachment of 
President Clinton after he left office due to his eleventh-hour pardons. In-
deed, if officers could escape impeachment through a last-minute resigna-
tion, as with President Nixon, they could retain the ability to serve in a public 
post in the future—no disqualification would attach. 
Under our constitutional scheme, however, ample political checks re-
main even if offenders can escape disqualification. First, Presidents and 
other executive branch officers may be deterred from wrongdoing, if not by 
the impeachment remedy, then by history. They know that wrongdoing at 
the end of a term may tarnish their historical record. Congress has publicized 
executive branch wrongdoing after the fact, as with the use of torture after 
9/1137 and domestic surveillance38 and, on several occasions, Congress has 
directed resolutions of censure at executive branch officials.39
Second, existing political process safeguards should minimize the risk 
of lawless behavior. If Presidents choose to run for reelection after resigning, 
they face electoral disapproval. And, there were no term limits at the Found-
ing. Although the public might not be as concerned with the wrongdoing as 
is Congress, the voters likely will take that challenged conduct into account 
(and the fact of resignation), even if no impeachment process unfolded. 
If a President does not run for reelection, which would likely be the 
case, he or she may well be concerned about how his or her party will fare at 
 36.  See, e.g., Kalt, supra note 1, at 69–72. Future Supreme Court Justice James Iredell at the Con-
vention stated that impeachment “will be not only the means of punishing misconduct, but it will prevent 
misconduct. A man in public office who knows that there is no tribunal to punish him, may be ready to 
deviate from his duty . . . .” 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 32 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836). Of course, the deterrence argument does 
not apply to judges who serve for life. Ironically, there have been more impeachments of Article III judges 
by far than of executive branch officials. 
 37.  See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON 
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (2004), https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/re-
port/911Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YFM-H7RC].
 38.  See Jenna McLaughlin, Congressional Hearings on Surveillance Programs to Kick Off—in Se-
cret, THE INTERCEPT (Jan. 28, 2016, 7:14 AM), https://theintercept.com/2016/01/28/congressional-hear-
ings-on-surveillance-programs-to-kick-off-in-secret/ [https://perma.cc/CRR2-DBYW]. 
 39.  See Ed Kilgore, If Congress Doesn’t Impeach and Remove Trump, It Could Still Censure Him,
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the polls, so the constraint of electoral accountability exists.40 With respect 
to an executive branch officer who resigns amidst controversy, there is little 
chance of subsequent reappointment by a different President. The Senate, of 
course, must ratify all such appointments. 
Finally, the criminal law remains as a deterrent to most impeachable 
conduct. Although Congress has leeway to determine what constitutes a 
High Crime and Misdemeanor, the bribery and treason examples used in the 
Constitution can be punished criminally, as can many other offenses, includ-
ing the obstruction charges that lay at the heart of the Clinton and Trump 
impeachments. Thus, the deterrence argument for a continuing power of im-
peachment is not overwhelming.
B. Allowing Congresses to Look Backwards for Impeachment 
A continuous power of impeachment would remove the constraint of 
contemporaneity. Future Congresses would judge the conduct of Presidents 
and other civil officers from the perspective of a different political and social 
milieu. From the vantage point of subsequent Congresses, President Clinton 
may have had a #MeToo problem; President Lyndon Johnson evidently 
spoke disparagingly about race; President George W. Bush lied to the public 
about domestic surveillance, and so on. And, although historical judgment 
may, at times, be healthy, the power of impeachment comes with tangible 
penalties. 
Indeed, the Constitution does not otherwise welcome judgments based 
on evolutionary standards of conduct. Through the Ex Post Facto Clause, the 
Framers expressed their conviction that individuals should be judged based 
on previously articulated standards of conduct, not those that might arise in 
the future.41 Reading the Constitution to permit impeachment twenty years 
after the fact would allow subsequent Congresses to penalize prior office-
holders even as understandings of High Crimes and Misdemeanors evolve. 
In other words, the Ex Post Facto Clause evinces the Framers’ concern that 
punishment be based only upon previously established norms of misconduct. 
Impeachment should be seen as a narrow exception to the ex post facto norm 
in that the conduct warranting impeachment need not first be spelled out. A 
continuous power of impeachment would gouge a much greater hole into the 
ex post facto ideal. Confining impeachment to sitting officers ensures that 
 40.  The Framers themselves did not anticipate the rise of political parties. See, e.g., James A. Gard-
ner, Can Party Politics Be Virtuous?, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 667, 667–68 (2000). 
 41.  The Supreme Court’s early rejection of the British tradition of recognizing a common law of 
crimes is to the same effect. Conduct had to be spelled out in advance of criminal prosecution. See United 
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presidents and civil officers will be judged by contemporaries, despite the 
offer of John Quincy Adams.42
At the same time, the continuous power could tempt majorities in the 
House and Senate to seize current political advantage by visiting impeach-
ment upon former Presidents and civil officers of the other party. The ma-
jority party could threaten to impeach former officeholders of the minority 
party unless support is forthcoming on a particular appropriations or other 
bill. In other words, the ongoing threat of impeachment might distort law-
making.43 In short, a continuous power is difficult to reconcile with ex post 
facto principles and, as a functional matter, might interfere with the balance 
of powers otherwise prescribed in the Constitution. 
C. Punishment 
To the former officer targeted, a continuing power of impeachment 
raises many of the same problems as does the constitutionally-banned Bill of 
Attainder. In Fletcher v. Peck, Chief Justice Marshall famously wrote that 
“the framers of the [C]onstitution viewed, with some apprehension, the vio-
lent acts which might grow out of the feelings of the moment,” and thereby 
restricted the power of Congress and state legislatures to pass Bills of At-
tainder and ex post facto laws.44 The Founders enacted the Bill of Attainder 
prohibition to prevent the legislature from singling out individuals for pun-
ishment—criminal punishment can only be meted consistent with the safe-
guards of the judicial process.45 Yet, a continuous power would eliminate 
any notion of a statute of limitations and subject civil officers to a perpetual 
threat of impeachment, even as memories and evidence fade. 
 42.  See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 43.  Moreover, a power of continuing impeachment could invite party loyalists to game the system. 
Assume that one party holds a majority of the House and a supermajority in the Senate. Congress then 
could dredge up misconduct by former executive branch officers of the opposite party who are potential 
candidates in the upcoming election. 
 44.  10 U.S. 87, 137–38 (1810). 
 45.  Another risk exists. Although the Senate must reach a two-thirds supermajority before remov-
ing an officer under Senatorial precedent, Senators vote for disqualification separately from removal 
merely upon a majority vote. Should that precedent hold, then a bare majority of the Senate, after im-
peachment by the House, could convict a civil officer. The extraordinary two-thirds level inserted in the 
Constitution would be evaded. 
Supporters of a continuous impeachment power might argue that a two-thirds vote for disqualification 
would be needed if there had been no prior two-thirds vote for removal. The answer may be that the 
Senate precedent is just wrong—that the Senate should either automatically disqualify all convicted of-
ficers from holding office in the future or disqualify based on the same two-thirds vote required to remove 
an officer from office. But, the Senate’s practice does suggest the danger in separating the removal and 
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Moreover, the Supreme Court has construed the Bill of Attainder 
Clause to reach punitive action short of incarceration. In Cummings v. Mis-
souri, for example, the Supreme Court struck down a provision of Missouri’s 
constitution that precluded all who had sympathized with the South from 
holding a number of jobs within the state.46 The Court reasoned that “[t]he 
deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed, may be pun-
ishment.”47 And, in Ex parte Garland, decided the same day, the Court sim-
ilarly held that “exclusion from any of the professions or any of the ordinary 
avocations of life for past conduct can be regarded in no other light than as 
punishment for such conduct.”48 More recently, in United States v. Lovett,
the Court held that an appropriation act prohibiting any federal agency from 
paying further compensation to three specified individuals because of their 
Communist sympathies similarly was a Bill of Attainder.49
One might argue that disqualification from office is more of a preven-
tative measure than one of punishment. After all, the officer’s misconduct in 
the past arguably has made him or her unfit to hold any office of trust in the 
future. The Supreme Court has rejected the salience of that rationale in yet 
another Bill of Attainder case, United States v. Brown.50 At stake was dis-
qualification of anyone who had been a member of the Communist Party 
within the past five years from being an officer or employee of a labor union. 
To the Court, however, “[p]unishment serves several purposes; retributive, 
rehabilitative, deterrent—and preventative. One of the reasons society im-
prisons those convicted of crimes is to keep them from inflicting future harm, 
but that does not make imprisonment any the less punishment.”51 Disquali-
fication plainly falls into the type of legislative action that falls within the 
scope of the Bill of Attainder provision. 
The possibility of vindictiveness goes beyond disqualification from fu-
ture office. Consider that Congress could pass a statute stripping all officers 
who have been impeached of their federal pensions.52 In this age of partisan-
ship, one can readily imagine use of the impeachment remedy to strip pen-
sions from leaders of the opposing party who formerly held office, even 
years after their service. To construe impeachment to allow such a backdoor 
 46.  71 U.S. 277, 320, 322 (1866). 
 47.  Id. at 320. 
 48.  71 U.S. 333, 377 (1866). 
49. 328 U.S. 303, 316 (1946). 
 50.  381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965). 
 51.  Id.
 52.  Congress has enacted a provision stripping pensions from a President who has been removed 
from office during his or her term. 3 U.S.C. § 102 (2011). Congress readily could extend the statute to 
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into Bills of Attainder runs counter to the constitutional design. Separating 
disqualification from future office from removal from current office trans-
forms the impeachment remedy into a punishment. 
Of course, in a sense, the Bill of Attainder argument proves too much, 
because impeachment is a constitutionally recognized exception to the pro-
scription on Bills of Attainder. The argument here, rather—parallel to rea-
soning about the ex post facto norm—is that the greater the temporal reach 
of the impeachment authority, the greater the tension with surrounding con-
stitutional provisions. Given the Framers’ insistence that Congress’s power 
be limited by prohibiting Bills of Attainder, Congress’s power of impeach-
ment should be confined to contemporaneous concerns. 
CONCLUSION
The temporal dimension of impeachments may never become a conten-
tious issue in the future. Yet, focus on the language in the two impeachment 
clauses as well as on the structure of the Constitution as a whole lends strong 
support to the argument that impeachment should be confined to those occu-
pying an office, and departure from that office deprives Congress of juris-
diction. The deterrence argument for a continuing power of impeachment is 
overstated, and for Congress to be able to impeach and disqualify an officer 
years after the conduct in question (and possibly by a majority vote in the 
Senate) would resemble too closely a Bill of Attainder. 
To be sure, it may seem discordant that an officer can escape future 
disqualification by resigning before the House can finish debating impeach-
ment and certainly before the Senate has voted on whether to convict. But, 
the Belknap scenario can be addressed without recognizing a continuous 
power. It does little violence to the constitutional text to reason that, as long 
as an officer served in office at the time formal impeachment proceedings 
started, then the House and Senate retain jurisdiction to continue the process 
because the officer was “in office” at the commencement of the proceedings. 
Indeed, examples of this dynamic in our jurisprudence are many. For 
one example, consider diversity jurisdiction. If the parties are diverse at the 
time the proceeding is initiated, the federal courts long have maintained ju-
risdiction even if one of the parties thereafter moves and diversity no longer 
exists.53
 53.  As Chief Justice Marshall stated in Mollan v. Torrance, 9 Wheat. 537, 539 (1824), “[i]t is quite 
clear, that the jurisdiction of the Court depends on the state of things at the time of the action brought, 
and that after vesting, it cannot be ousted by subsequent events”; see also Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 
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For another example, an Article III case or controversy can continue 
even if developments after initiation of the suit seemingly moot the contro-
versy. Of greatest relevance here, voluntary action of the parties, like a res-
ignation in the impeachment context, rarely moots the controversy because 
the harm can be renewed—in this case resumption of public office.54 Just as 
with courts’ jurisdiction over controversies, Congress’s jurisdiction over im-
peachment can be ascertained at the formal start of impeachment, not at the 
end, and in that way, the importance of the disqualification remedy is pre-
served. 
On the other hand, if the officer serves out his term or resigns (or is 
fired) before the House commences proceedings, no jurisdiction to proceed 
should exist. President Clinton’s eleventh-hour pardons may be criticized by 
history and may have hurt his party, but should not be subject to an official 
impeachment inquiry. Once President Trump leaves office, he should not be 
called to account for his conduct by future Congresses bent on impeachment. 
The Framers designed the impeachment remedy to protect the public by re-
moving an officer, not to punish the offender. 
 54.  See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envt’l Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 191 (2000); United States 
v. Or. State Medical Soc’y, 343 U.S. 326, 333 (1952). 
